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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Trusts-"PourOver" From a Will to an Inter
Vivos Trust Under Statute
Decedent, W, simultaneously executed an inter vivos trust and a
"pour-over" will. W placed approximately four-fifths of her property
in the trust; the remaining one-fifth was to pass under the will. W
died three months later. The will provided that W's husband, H,
should receive a $5,000 legacy and some of W's personal effects.
The residue, $75,000, was devised to the trustee of the inter vivos
trust and was to be added to and commingled with the other trust
property. The executor-trustee sought to have the will admitted to
probate. H argued that the will should not be admitted to probate
without admitting the trust instrument because the trust agreement
was incorporated in the will by reference and that he was deprived
of his statutory marital rights. H's real objective was the $280,000
in the inter vivos trust. The probate court admitted the will but
did not require the admission of the trust instrument. Held, affirmed.
The will did not incorporate the trust agreement by reference. The
Probate Act allows testamentary additions to trusts and does not
require that the trust agreement be admitted to probate with a
"pour-over" will. In re Estate of Meskimen, 228 N.E. 2d 255 (Ill.
App. 1967).
There have been few decisions on the validity of "pour-over"
provisions of wills into inter vivos trusts in jurisdictions which have
provided express statutory authorization for testamentary additions
to trusts. In states like West Virginia which have enacted such
legislation,' the practicing lawyer who desires to take advantage of
the utility of the "pour-over" device for his client faces a dilemma.
Should he use the "pour-over" and take a slight chance that the
court might not uphold all of the provisions of the "pour-over" will
and receptacle trust under the uninterpreted statute? Or, should he
forego the "pour-over" until the state of the law on statutory testa-
mentary additions to trusts becomes relatively settled? The difficulty
with the former alternative is that the courts really have no single
theory to enable them to interpret consistently the "pour-over"
statutes.2 This lack of underlying theory would pose no problem if
current problems could be solved on the basis of the statutory
language alone.' But the language of the "pour-over" statutes is
W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 3, §§ 8-11 (Michie 1966).
2 Hawley, The "Statutory Blessing" and Pour Over Problems, 43 TnUST
BULL. 42 (Dec. 1963).
3 Id. at 46.
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generally much too vague to enable the courts to rely soley on it for
guidance.' Therefore, there is a need for a basic theory upon which
to support and interpret the statute.
The "pour-over" device, when properly used, can be a very
effective tool of the estate planner. Some of the reasons advanced
for the use of "pour-over" wills are: (1) obtaining trustee manage-
ment in later life and unity of management at death; (2) creating
a receptacle trust on the death of the first spouse into which the
surviving spouse can pourover and obtain unity of management;
(3) creating a receptacle for life insurance proceeds where trustee
management can afford greater flexibility in dispositive arrangements
than the rigid dispositive schemes of settlement options; (4)
eliminating probate costs on the portion of the estate placed in the
inter vivos trust; (5) obtaining secrecy of distribution; (6) avoiding
court costs in states in which the court retains jurisdiction over a
testamentary trust; (7) avoiding some death and income taxes when
the trust is irrevocable; and (8) allowing a choice of jurisdiction
in which to administer the trust.5 In many jurisdictions a latent
and more questionable objective for using the "pour-over" device,
and a by-product of its use regardless of the primary purpose, is to
restrict severely the surviving spouse's inheritance by preventing him
(her) from electing against the portion of the estate placed in the
inter vivos trust.6 In the principal case the surviving spouse was
prevented from reaching four-fifths of the deceased spouse's estate.
Before testamentary additions to trusts statutes were adopted,
courts were confronted with two problems in recognizing the
validity of the "pour-over" will. Rarely was the trust instrument, or
amendments to it after the execution of the will, executed in accord-
ance with the Statute of Wills.7 To overcome this obstacle courts
used two doctrines-incorporation by reference and facts of inde-
pendent significance-to uphold "pour-overs" to trusts and amended
trusts not meeting the requirements of the Statute of Wills.' The
4 For an extensive discussion of possible interpretation problems with
statutory "pour-overs" see McClanahan, The Pour-Over Device Comes of Age,
39 S. CAL. L. REV. 163 (1966). See also Hawley, The "Statutory Blessing"
and Pour Over Problems, 43 TRUST BuIL. 42 (Dec. 1963); Schipper, Possible
Problem Areas with Pour Over Wills, 1 REAL PROPERTY PROBATE AND TRUST
J. 366 (1966).5 Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 56, 67 (1967); McClanahan, The Pour-Over
Device Comes of Age, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 165 (1966).
6 See generally 25 Omno STATE L.J. 612 (1964).
7 See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 56, 61 (1967).8 Id.
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doctrine of "incorporation by reference" recognizes that a valid will
may incorporate into it an extrinsic document not executed in
accordance with the Statute of Wills, if the document is in existence
when the will is executed and referred to in the will as an existing
document.9 The doctrine of "facts of independent significance"
states that in certain cases one may look to facts contained in a
non-testamentary instrument to add significance to the will. The
classic examples are bequeaths of "the contents of my safety deposit
box" and "to each of my employees at my death". In both instances
the subject or recipient of the disposition is determined from facts
having significance apart from the will. Therefore, the test is whether
the facts have significance apart from the disposition of the be-
queathed property. ' ° Under the doctrine of "incorporation by refer-
ence" the trust instrument must exist at the time the will is executed,
but under the doctrine of "facts of independent significance," only
the fact that a trust exists at the time of the testator's death need
be proved." If the intent of the testator is to keep the probate court
from having jurisdiction of the trust in order to maintain secrecy of
distribution, the doctrine of "facts of independent significance" must
be the theory under which the "pour-over" is validated. This is
because the doctrine of "incorporation by reference" incorporates
the trust instrument into the will thereby making the trust agreement
come within the province of the probate court as a testamentary
disposition of property."2
Today forty-four jurisdictions have adopted testamentary addi-
tions to trust acts, or what are often called "pour-over" statutes.' 3
The purpose of the statutes was to authorize expressly the "pour-
over" device which had become a favored estate-planning tool. The
statutes were needed because the courts were having difficulty
validating "pour-overs" under common law rules. Of these forty-
four, twenty states, among them West Virginia, have adopted the
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act or some from of it."
9 See Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 220, 221 (1952); 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 233
(1948); 1 ScoTT § 54.1 (1956).10 See Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 214, 140 A. 279 (1928); 1
Scorr § 54.2 (1956); Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HAM. L. REV.
521, 547 (1930).
" McClanahan, The Pour-Over Device Comes of Age, 39 S. CAL. L. REv.
163, 178 (1966).
,2 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 233 (1948).
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Research has disclosed in addition to the MesKimen case only four
decisions' 5 pertaining to statutory "pour-overs." An analysis of these
cases does not reveal any one consistent theory under which con-
clusions as to the validity of what can be termed statutory "pour-
overs" has been decided.
The earliest reported case involving a "pour-over" statute is
In re Guggenheimer's Estate.6 The settlor devised the property to the
trustee. The income was to be distributed to two beneficiaries for
life and a small life annuity to a third beneficiary. Then the income
was to be for the use of poor people. The settlor directed that if
certain of his relatives were poor they were to be given preference
in the distribution of the income from the trust to poor people. The
beneficiary of the life annuity predeceased the settlor. The will
created a testamentary trust and poured over the residue of the
settlor's estate to the trust. The trustee sought construction of the
will under a New York statute which allowed "pour-overs" to trusts
promoting the well-being of mankind."7 The court held that the
"pour-over" to the existing testamentary trust was valid. 8 The court
validated the "pour-over" because it was executed in accordance
with the provisions of the statute. 9 No statement was made as to
any general theory under which the "pour-over" was upheld.
The first case which really construed the effect of a "pour-over"
statute was Bircher v. Wasson.2" The inter vivos trust provided the
income was to be distributed for the use of the settlor's grandchildren,
and upon the death of any of them his share to the use of the
surviving grandchildren. The principal was to be distributed to the
surviving grandchildren twenty-one years after the settlor's death.
The testator's will, executed the same day as the trust, funneled all
of the testator's real property into the inter vivos trust. Bircher,
one of the settlor-testator's children brought a petition for construc-
tion of the will contending that for the "pour-over" to be valid the
trust agreement must be incorporated by reference into the will.
The lower court held that the trust agreement was incorporated into
the will and the "pour-over" was valid. In affirming on appeal, the
Is In one of the four, Bank of Del. v. Bank of Del., 39 Del. Ch. 187, 161
A.2d 430 (1960), the court made its decision without having to consider
the effect of the 'pour-over" statute.
16 168 Misc. 1, 5 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1938).
" 7 N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 12 (Cahill 1937).
18 In re Guggenheimer's Estate, 168 Misc. 1, 5 N.Y.S.2d 137, 144 (1938).
19 id.
20 133 Ind. App. 27, 180 N.E.2d 118 (1962).
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Indiana court held that the "pour-over" was incorporated into
the will by reference and valid under the existing "pour-over"
statute."' By contrast, the appellate court in the principal case found
the trust was not incorporated into the will by reference. The Indiana
court further decided that the trust was not testamentary in char-
acter.22 The Indiana statute is narrow in scope.23 Therefore, in
most instances it can be interpreted on the statutory language alone.
This removes the necessity for an underlying theory as a guide to
construction. However, the broad, all-inclusive language of the
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act requires a theory for
consistent interpretation. The Indiana court did not hint as to any
such theory in Bircher.
In Knowles v. Knowles " the settlor simultaneously executed an
inter vivos trust and a will pouring over to it. The purported corpus
of the trust consisted of life insurance policies of which the beneficiary
was the settlor's wife. The settlor did not change the beneficiary
of the policies to the trustee, his brother. The policies were never
delivered to the trustee. The settlor's wife brought an action to
construe the will and determine the validity of the trust. The court
first held the inter vivos trust void for lack of a res.2" Yet, the
court said by dictum that the statute in Ohio validates "pour-overs"
to inter vivos trusts and established the doctrine of "facts of inde-
pendent significance" as the underlying theory of the statute.2
However, a mandatory requirement of the Ohio statute is that there
must be a res into which the residue of a will can pour over.27
21 BuRNs' ANNO. STATS. § 6-601 (1953 Repl.).
(j) If a testator devises real or personal property to be added to a
trust or trust fund which is clearly identified in his will and which
is in existence when his will is executed, such devise shall be valid
and effective. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so
devised shall be subject to the terms and provisions of the trust
instrument or instruments governing the trust or trust fund even
22 though amended or modified after the execution of the will.
Bircher v. Wasson, 133 Ind. App. 27, 43, 180 N.E.2d 118, 125 (1962).
23 BURNs' AtNo. STATs. § 6-601 (j) (1953 Repl.).
244 Ohio Misc. 153, 212 N.E.2d 88 (1965).
25 Knowles v. Knowles, 4 Ohio Misc. 153, 158, 212 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1965).
2 61d.
27 OMO IIvisEaD CODE ANNO. § 2107.63 (Page 1954).
A testator may by will, devise, bequeath, or appoint real or personal
property, or any interest in such property, to a trustee of a trust
which is evidenced by a written instrument executed by the
testator . . . either before or on the same date of the execution of
such will and which is identified in such will.
The property or interest so devised, bequeathed, or appointed
to such trustee shall be added to and become a part of the trust
estate, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court having
[Vol. 70
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Although the "pour-over" device failed because the inter vivos trust
failed, the court found an intent to create a testamentary trust. Even
though the inter vivos trust was void, the trust instrument was
held to be incorporated into the will by reference and was said to be
the basis for a testamentary trust. The court then decided that the
settlor's wife held the proceeds in constructive trust and must pay
the proceeds of the policies to the trustee.2" Then the trustee was to
distribute the income from the trust funds in accordance with the
terms of the void inter vivos trust.
Neither the Indiana nor Ohio statutes allowed "pour-overs" to
trusts "regardless of the existence of the corpus of the trust" as the
West Virginia statute does.29 Although the West Virginia statute
provides that the trust instrument must be executed before or con-
currently with the will,3" whether the West Virginia court will
validate a "pour-over" to a naked trust instrument without an existing
trust corpus remains to be seen. The West Virginia court can decline
to validate such a trust by saying that the Uniform Act was designed
to validate "pour-overs", not to change existing trust law. Or the
court can take the suggestion of one writer that the Uniform Act
is a statutory adoption of a liberal incorporation by reference doctrine
and uphold a "pour-over" to a trust without a res.
The West Virginia statute provides that the court shall construe
the act in accordance with its construction in other jurisdictions to
preserve uniformity in decisions under the act. 2 In view of the lack
of concrete judicial interpretation of the act one might consider the
possibility of an adverse decision by the West Virginia court before
using the "pour-over" device in West Virginia. Perhaps a safer
jurisdiction of such trust, and shall be administered in accordance
with the terms and provisions of the instrument creating such trust,
including, unless the will specifically provides otherwise, any amend-
ments or modifications thereof made in writing before, concurrently
with, or after the making of the will and prior to the death of the
testator. The termination of such trust, or its entire revocation prior
to the testator's death, shall invalidate such devise, bequest, or
appointment to such trust.
28 Knowles v. Knowles, 4 Ohio Misc. 153, 162, 212 N.E.2d 88, 94 (1965).
29 W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 3, § 8 (Michie 1966); For other problems
with statutory "pour-overs" see note 4, supra.30 1d.
31 CASEY, ESTATE PLANNING DEsK BOOK § 615 (1961).
It makes no difference that the trust has not come into legal
existence by delivery of the corpus to the trustee, so long as the
instrument creating the trust was already in existence or came into
,existence concurrently with the execution of the will.
32 W. VA. CoDE ch. 41, art. 3, § 10 (Michie 1966).
1968]
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alternative is to set up the inter vivos trust in a jurisdiction such as
Massachusetts where the validity of "pour-overs" has been well-
established by case law.33
James Edward Seibert
33 Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 366, 371,
107 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1960).
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